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- सिद्धसेनाचार्य



nikkyjain@gmail.com
Date : 17-Nov-2022

Index


अधिकार

नयमीमांसा ज्ञानमीमांसा ज्ञेयमीमांसा







Index


गाथा / सूत्रविषय

नयमीमांसा

1-01) Introductory verse in the form of a panegyric of the teaching of the prophet of Jainism with its peculiar merits --
1-02) Second verse makes the declaration of composing the work Sanmati-Tarka and states its object in doing so --
1-03) Third verse indicates the main subjectmatter of this work --
1-04) 3 Subdivisions of Dravyastika Naya
1-05) 4 Subdivisions of Rjusutra Naya
1-06) Here in this verse the author enumerates the varieties of Niksepa' method and the distribution of the principal Nayas in it.
1-07) Distribution of Nayas amongst various statements.
1-08) Circumstances under which there occurs an overlapping of these two Principal Nayas are mentioned in the following verse --
1-09) The author in the following verse now sums up the discussion of the overlapping of the two principal Nayas
1-10) Attitude of each Naya towards the other rival Naya
1-12) Characteristic of a real or entire thing or a thing in its integral whole
1-13) In the following verse the author explains as to how both these Nayas become wrong in their exclusive assertions --
1-14) How and when both the Nayas can be regarded as right --
1-16) No single Naya of all the subsequent Nayas, is competent to comprehend the Reality in its entirety --
1-17-021) We cannot account for this worldly life, happiness and misery, bondage and liberation if we adhere exclusively to the stand point of one single Naya.
1-22-025) If Nayas act in harmony with each other, then alone they can be deemed right in their views.
1-26) The method of illustration has got its own merits
1-27) If there is no co-relativity between Nayas, it leads to the sure defect of a Naya --
1-28) How a man well versed in Anekanta looks at various views --
1-29) These are the limitations of each Naya
1-30) Nay difference in its minute details
1-31) How one substance becomes manifold
1-32) An illustration of a Vyanjana Paryāya
1-34) Clear distinction between Vyanjana Paryaya and Artha Paryaya --
1-35) Exclusiveness of a viewpoint is always faulty and unscientific --
1-36-040) Main feature of the Sapta-bhangi or the Heptagonic forms of ontological enquiry
1-41) Distribution of these seven modes between Artha-paryaya and Vyanjana-paryaya --
1-42) Paryayarthika-naya does not cover the whole truth.
1-44-046) What in reality is the intrinsic nature of a man?
1-47-048) The soul and the matter are from one point of view - one and from another point of view different
1-49) How things are philosophically termed when this intermingling of the soul and matter is taken into consideration
1-50) Why a particular principle or element is said to be internal and why another is said to be external
1-51-052) What, then, is the standpoint of each Naya with reference to the soul and matter ?
1-53) Jaina viewpoint
1-54) even in Jaina view mentioned there is a place for exception

ज्ञानमीमांसा

2-01) Difference between Gyana (knowledge) from Darsana (perception) --
2-02) How far one and the same thing appears different at the time of its perception and at the time of its knowledge --
2-03) As a rule these two cognitions-perception and knowledge-do not occur or take place at one and the same time, but even this rule has its limitation
2-04) the view of -- the consecutiveness of perception and knowledge which is based on Agama
2-05-08) Introduction to Sahavadipaksa (the view of simultaneousness ) to criticise the Kramavadi-paksa.
2-09) the Siddhantavadi (author) first questions his opponent and then introduces his own viewpoint
2-10-14) Author charges his opponent with the following faults (in argument)
2-15) Kramavadi tries to defend himself but is finally silenced by the author
2-16-17) Author explains the illustration given in the preceding verse and establishes finally his own views
2-18) Verse 18th wipes out scriptural inconsistencies
2-19) Author removes all the doubts as regards his own view
2-20) Another reason as to why one Absolute knowledge is said to be twofold
2-21-22) Following two verses describe the partial view (Ekadesi)
2-23-24) Illustration given by the Ekadesi objector
2-25) Siddhanti defines clearly the term Darsana
2-26) Over-absurdity (Atiprasanga) avoided
2-27) Further explanation regarding accepted arrangement
2-28) Why Sruta-Gyana is not Darsana ?
2-29) Arrangement of Avadhi-darsana
2-30) Both Gyana and Darsana can simultaneously fit in with Kevala-upayoga which is only one
2-31) Contradiction evidenced in Canonical literature avoided
2-32-33) Explanation of Darsana when used in the sense of faith
2-34-36) Mention of a delusion created by the word Sadi-aparyavasita and its removal
2-37-42) Doubt as to the difference between Jiva and Kevala and its removal through example
2-43) Corroboration of difference in the same modificatory change

ज्ञेयमीमांसा

3-01-02) Mutual identity of the general and the particular
3-03-04) Pratitya (authentic) vachana
3-05-06) How the attributes of existence as well as of non-existence are possible in one and the same thing
3-07) Both difference and sameness can reside in one and the same person
3-08) discussion of the oneness or otherwise of a substance & and its attributes. The author first of all mentions the viewpoint of his opponent
3-09-15) With a view to refute this view-point the author in the following verse first of all tries to establish an identity between attributes and transformations of a substance
3-16-18) Arguments of the person who regard a subsance and its quality as absolutely identical
3-19) Upon this the author objects in the following verse thus
3-20) Person holding the view of absolute identity defends his own position thus
3-21) To this the author replies in the following verse
3-22) Both the argument of the complete identity and its refutation by the author
3-23-24) The following verses analyse the difference of substance and quality as advanced by the persons holding the view of absolute difference and prove that the definitions of substance and quality, forwarded by him do not hold much water.
3-25-26) The following two verses give the aim of the above discussion
3-35-37) Discussion of time-distinction etc. of origination, destruction and permanence.
3-43-45) Distinction between dogmatic and rational scriptures
3-46-49) Discussion of Naya-vada
3-50-52) Difference between Ekanta and Anekanta. standpoints in the case of Karya (effect)
3-53) Theories of causation? are Mithya (false) if they are based on Ekanta view-point and Samyak (true if they are grounded on Anekanta.
3-54-55) Invalidity of Nastitva etc. six theories as regards "soul"
3-56-59) Faults liable to crop up in the debate due to the absence of Anekanta Drsti
3-60) A proper method to make an exposition of a Tattwa. (Reality)
3-61-62) Faults in a Sutra which is taken as perfect
3-63) Important merits for the exposition of a Sastric lore
3-64-65) Statement as to what should be done for the attainment of perfect knowledge of the realities
3-66-67) Statement of faults which find place in outward show without serious thinking



!! श्रीसर्वज्ञवीतरागाय नम: !!

आचार्य सिद्धसेन-देव-विरचित

श्री
सन्मतितर्क


मूल प्राकृत सूत्र

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!! नम: श्रीसर्वज्ञवीतरागाय !!

ओंकारं बिन्दुसंयुक्तं नित्यं ध्यायन्ति योगिनः
कामदं मोक्षदं चैव ॐकाराय नमो नम: ॥1॥

अविरलशब्दघनौघप्रक्षालितसकलभूतलकलंका
मुनिभिरूपासिततीर्था सरस्वती हरतु नो दुरितान् ॥2॥

अज्ञानतिमिरान्धानां ज्ञानाञ्जनशलाकया
चक्षुरुन्मीलितं येन तस्मै श्रीगुरवे नम: ॥3॥

॥ श्रीपरमगुरुवे नम:, परम्पराचार्यगुरुवे नम: ॥

सकलकलुषविध्वंसकं, श्रेयसां परिवर्धकं, धर्मसम्बन्धकं, भव्यजीवमन: प्रतिबोधकारकं, पुण्यप्रकाशकं, पापप्रणाशकमिदं शास्त्रं श्रीसन्मतितर्क नामधेयं, अस्य मूलाग्रन्थकर्तार: श्रीसर्वज्ञदेवास्तदुत्तरग्रन्थकर्तार: श्रीगणधरदेवा: प्रतिगणधरदेवास्तेषां वचनानुसारमासाद्य आचार्य श्रीसिद्धसेनदेव विरचितं, श्रोतार: सावधानतया शृणवन्तु ॥



मंगलं भगवान् वीरो मंगलं गौतमो गणी
मंगलं कुन्दकुन्दार्यो जैनधर्मोऽस्तु मंगलम्‌ ॥
सर्वमंगलमांगल्यं सर्वकल्याणकारकं
प्रधानं सर्वधर्माणां जैनं जयतु शासनम्‌ ॥

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नयमीमांसा



+ Introductory verse in the form of a panegyric of the teaching of the prophet of Jainism with its peculiar merits -- -
सिद्धं सिद्धत्थाणं ठाणमणोवमसुहं उवगयाणं ।
कुसमयविसासणं सासणं जिणाणं भवजिणाणं ॥1॥

Meaning : The teaching of Jinas i. e, the Conquerors of attachment and hatred, the teaching with its twelve subdivisions stands supreme on its own merit. For that teaching is the repository of irrefutable matter. That teaching is supremely blissful to those who approach it meekly for protection. That teaching is competent to refute false doctrines of Absolutism.

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+ Second verse makes the declaration of composing the work Sanmati-Tarka and states its object in doing so -- -
समयपरमत्थवित्थरविहाडजणपज्जुवासणसयन्नो।
आगममलारहियओ जह होइ तमत्थमुन्नेसुं ॥2॥

Meaning : I shall deal with such a matter as, when stated, will inspire or stimulate even an idle fellow, with a mind as dull as that of a bull in comprehending the meaning of scriptures, to wait upon Savants or learned men who clearly illuminate real things referred to in the sacred books.

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+ Third verse indicates the main subjectmatter of this work -- -
तित्थयरवयणसंगह-विसेसपत्थारमूलवागरणी ।
दव्वट्ठिओ य पज्जवणओ य सेसा वियप्पा सिं ॥3॥

Meaning : The Noumenal (Dravyarthika) and the Phenomenal (Paryayarthika) i.e. the analytical methods of inquiry, are the two fundamental methods (the two Nayas) that cover the general and the particular view.points of things as stated by Tirthankaras. All other analytical methods of inquiry fall under these two heads only.

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+ 3 Subdivisions of Dravyastika Naya -
दव्वट्ठियनयपयडी सुद्धा संगहपरूवणाविसओ ।
पडिरूवे पुण वयणत्थनिच्छओ तस्स ववहारो ॥४॥

Meaning : The fundamental nature of Dravyastika in its extreme form is what is called Sangraha Naya and limited generalizations as regards particular things come under the head of Vyavahara Naya.

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+ 4 Subdivisions of Rjusutra Naya -
मूलणिमेणं पज्जवणयस्स उज्जुसुयवयणविच्छेदो ।
तस्स उ सहाईआ साहपसाहा सुहुमभेया ॥5॥

Meaning : Rjusutra Naya is the very foundation of the Paryayastika Naya. Sabda and other minor Nayas are, of course, subtle varieties of Rjusutra, its branches and twigs.

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+ Here in this verse the author enumerates the varieties of Niksepa' method and the distribution of the principal Nayas in it. -
नामं ठवणा दविए त्ति एस दव्यट्ठियस्स निक्खेवो ।
भावो उ पज्जवट्ठिअस्स परूवणा एस परमत्थो ॥6॥

Meaning : Name (Nama)picture (Sthapana) and potentiality (Dravya) are the varieties of Niksepa which are applicable to Dravyastika while Bhava includes under it Paryayastika.

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+ Distribution of Nayas amongst various statements. -
पज्जवणिस्सामण्णं वयणं दव्वट्ठियस्स 'अत्थि' त्ति ।
अवसेसो वयणविही पज्जवभयणा सपडिवक्खो ॥7॥

Meaning :  Dravyastika Naya in its pure form is only concerned with the simple statement 'It is' that is to say when the thing is inentioned divested of all its particular attributes or modifications. All other statements deal, in one way or the other, with some attribute or the other and as such is the subject of both the Dravyastika and Paryayastika.

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+ Circumstances under which there occurs an overlapping of these two Principal Nayas are mentioned in the following verse -- -
पज्जवणयवोक्कंतं वत्थुं दव्वट्ठियस्स वयणिज्जं ।
जाव दविओवओगो अपच्छिमवियप्प-निव्वयणो ॥8॥

Meaning : Dravyastika includes in itself all those statements in which there is some sort of general statement. In all such statements there is an overlapping of Paryayastika also. Only that statement where there is no further possibility of particularization falls under the strict purview of pure Paryayastika.

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+ The author in the following verse now sums up the discussion of the overlapping of the two principal Nayas -
दव्वट्टिओ त्ति तम्हा नत्थि णओ णियम सुद्धजाईओ ।
ण य पज्जवट्ठिओ णाम कोइ भयणाय उ विसेसो ॥9॥

Meaning : This being the case, it is impossible to find a Dravyastika, in its pure form -- that is to say absolutely unmixed with Paryayastika. Similarly it is equally impossible to find a Paryayastika in its pure form that is to say totally unmixed with a Dravyastika. Hence assigning a particular statement to a particular Naya depends upon the volition of the speaker.

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+ Attitude of each Naya towards the other rival Naya -
दव्वट्ठियवत्तव्वं अवत्थु णियमेण पज्जवणयस्स ।
तह पज्जववत्थु अवत्थुमेव दवट्ठियनयस्स ॥१०॥

Meaning : Paryayastika does not view the positive assertion of Dravyastika as its legitimate subject. On the other hand Dravyastika looks down upon the statement of Parya. yastika in the same fashion.

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उप्पज्जंति वियंति य भावा नियमेण पज्जवणयस्स ।
दव्वट्ठियस्स सव्वं सया अणुप्पन्नमविणट्ठं ॥11॥

Meaning : From the standpoint of Paryayastika all things are necessarily born and perish; Dravyastika, on the other hand, holds that all things exist eternally without birth and decay.

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+ Characteristic of a real or entire thing or a thing in its integral whole -
दव्वं पज्जवविउयं, दव्वविउत्ता य पज्जवा णत्थि ।
उप्पाय-ट्ठिइ-भंगा, हंदि दवियलक्खणं एयं ॥12॥

Meaning : There cannot be a thing which is devoid of its modifications of birth and decay. On the other hand, modifications cannot exist without an abiding or eternal something -a permanent substance, for birth, decay and stability (continuance)-- these three constitute the characteristic of a substance or Entity.

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+ In the following verse the author explains as to how both these Nayas become wrong in their exclusive assertions -- -
एए पुण संगहओ पाडिक्कमलक्खणं दुवेण्हं पि ।
तम्हा मिच्छद्दिट्ठी पत्तेयं दो वि मूलणया ॥13॥

Meaning : These three characteristics of birth, decay and stability must dwell together in harmony to make a real definition of a thing in its integral form. Each Naya therefore, if taken independently, isolated from the other, can never yield an adequate idea of Sat an entity. Both these, therefore, divorced from each other, are wrong in their standpoints.

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+ How and when both the Nayas can be regarded as right -- -
ण य तइयो अस्थि णओ ण य सम्मत्तं ण तेसु पडिपुण्णं ।
जेण दुवे एगन्ता विभजमाणा अणेगन्तो ॥14॥

Meaning : There is no third Naya. Moreover, it can not be said that truth cannot be adequately expressed by these two Nayas; for if we combine both these standpoints in their particular aspects we can certainly arrive at the truth by the method of Anekanta (The Versatility of Aspects).

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जह एए तह अण्णे पत्तेयं दुण्णया णया सव्वे ।
हंदि हु मुलणयाणं पण्णवणे वावडा ते वि ॥15॥

Meaning : As these two Nayas when taken in their exclusiveness are false Nayas, all other Nayas also are wrong when taken in their isolated standpoints. For the subsequent Nayas occupy themselves in viewing the different aspects of the thing which is the subject of these two principal Nayas.

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+ No single Naya of all the subsequent Nayas, is competent to comprehend the Reality in its entirety -- -
सव्वणयसमूहम्मि वि णत्थि णओ उभयवायपण्णवओ ।
मूलणयाण उ आणं पत्तेयं विसेसियं बिंति ॥16॥

Meaning : Among all the subsequent Nayas, there is not a single Naya which has for its province both the aspects of a thing viz. the general and the particular-in their entirety. The reason is that all these Nayas look at the different aspects of the thing or Reality viewed by the principal Nayas.

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+ We cannot account for this worldly life, happiness and misery, bondage and liberation if we adhere exclusively to the stand point of one single Naya. -
ण य दव्वट्ठियपक्खे संसारो णेव पज्जवणयस्स ।
सासयवियत्तिवायी जम्हा उच्छेअवाईआ ॥17॥
सुह-दुक्खसम्पओगो ण जुज्जए णिच्चवायपक्खम्मि ।
एगंतुच्छेयम्मि य सुह-दुक्खवियप्पणमजुत्तं ॥18॥
कम्मं जोगनिमित्तं बज्झइ बन्धट्ठिई कसायवसा ।
अपरिणरउच्छिण्णेसु य बंघट्ठिइकारणं णत्थि ॥19॥
बंधम्मि अपूरन्ते संसारभओघदंसणं मोज्झं ।
बन्धं व विणा मोक्खसुहपत्थणा णत्थि मोक्खो य ॥20॥
तम्हा सव्वे वि णया मिच्छादिट्ठी सपक्खपडिबद्धा ।
अण्णोण्णणिस्सिआ उण हवंति सम्मत्तसब्भावा ॥21॥

Meaning : This worldly life cannot be accounted for from Dravyastika standpoint. It is equally unaccountable from Paryayastika point of view. For, the former holds that there is only one element and stable thing; while the latter holds that birth and decay are the true characteristics of a thing.
From the point of view of those who hold that an entity is unchangeable, happiness and misery cannot stand ; in the opinion of those who hold that things eternally change the idea of happiness and misery can never hold good.
'Action-current (yoga) attaches or binds a man through mind, speech and body. And it is through our passions (Kasayas) that this action-current binding a man takes its firm stand. But if we think that a thing is eternally unchangeable or when we think that thing is born and in a moment decays, we can never account for the binding of an action-current or its continuance.
If there is no binding by Actioncurrent, then it will be a folly to think that this worldly life is beset with perils. If, on the other hand, there be no Bandha i.e. binding then it is idle to desire the happiness of liberation in fact then there cannot be any such thing as liberation at all.
All the Nayas, therefore, in their exclusively individual standpoints are absolutely faulty. If, however, they consider themselves as supplementary of each other, they are right in their viewpoints.

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+ If Nayas act in harmony with each other, then alone they can be deemed right in their views. -
जहऽणेयलक्खणगुणा वेरुलियाई मणी विसंजुत्ता ।
रयणावलिववएसं न लहंति महग्घमुल्ला वि ॥22॥
तह णिययवायसुविणिच्छिया वि अण्णोण्णपक्खणिरवेक्खा ।
सम्मद्दंसणसद्दं सव्वे वि णया ण पावेंति ॥23॥
जह पुण ते चेव मणी जहा गुणविसेसभागपडिबद्धा ।
'रयणावलि'त्ति भएणइ जहंति पाडिक्कसण्णाउ ॥24॥
तह सव्वे णयवाया जहाणुरूवविणिउत्तवत्तव्वा ।
सम्मद्दंसणसद्दं लहन्ति ण विसेससण्णाओ ॥25॥

Meaning : Just as emerald and other jewels of rare quality and of excellent kind do not acquire the designation of a necklace of jewels even though all of them be priceless jewels on account of their lying unconnected with or disunited with each other, similarly every Naya in its own sphere is right, but if all of them arrogate to themselves the whole truth and disregard the views of rival Naya then they do not attain the status of a right view.
Moreover, just as those jewels unite with each other and occupy the place that is assigned to them individually in the string, they, all together, attain the designation of a necklace of jewels, disowning their individual names.
Similarly if all the Nayas arrange themselves in a proper way and supplement to each other, then alone they are worthy of being termed as the whole truth SamyagDarsana or the right view in its entirety. But in this case they merge their individuality in the collective whole.

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+ The method of illustration has got its own merits -
लोइयपरिच्छयसुहो निच्छयवयणपडिवत्तिमग्गो य ।
अह पण्णवणाविसउ त्ति तेण वीसत्थमुवणीओ ॥26॥

Meaning : An illustration appeals both to the man of common sense as well as to the man of science with his subtle intellect. It is an easy means of convincing them beyond doubt as regards the significance of a particular proposition.

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+ If there is no co-relativity between Nayas, it leads to the sure defect of a Naya -- -
इहरा समूहसिद्धो परिणामकओ व्व जो जहिं अत्थो ।
ते तं च ण तं तं चेव व त्ति नियमेण मिच्छत्तं ॥27॥

Meaning : Or if the Nayas the (standpoints) offend against the rule of mutual supplementing such as for instance when one says that the effect and the cause are identical ; or * another says that the effect can never be identical with the cause; or when a third says that the effect and the cause are not at all separate or different from each other. All these absolute statements or unqualified statements are wrong even though it is a fact that an effect is inherent in a cause in as much as the former is either a transformation of the latter or the former is a substance of which the latter forms the constituent.

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+ How a man well versed in Anekanta looks at various views -- -
णिययवयणिज्जसच्चा सव्वनया परवियालणे मोहा ।
ते उण ण दिट्ठसमओ विभयइ सच्चे व अलिए वा ॥28॥

Meaning : All the Nayas are right in their own respective spheres -- but if they encroach upon the province of other Nayas and they try to refute their views they are wrong.

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+ These are the limitations of each Naya -
दव्वट्ठियवत्तव्वं सव्वं सव्वेण णिच्चमवियप्पं ।
आरद्धो य विभागो पज्जववत्तव्वमग्गो य ॥29॥

Meaning : Dravyastika Naya has for its province all those objects which are stripped of every kind of difference -- but as soon as those objects are subjected to some sort of difference or division they become the province of Paryayastika Nay.

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+ Nay difference in its minute details -
जो उण समासओ च्चिय वंजणणिअओ य अत्थणिअओ य ।
अत्थगओ य अभिण्णो भइयव्वो वंजणवियप्पो ॥30॥

Meaning : Moreover, difference is of two kinds
  1. difference depending on words and
  2. difference not dependent on words that is to say conditioned by meaning.
A division as regards the object itself admits of no further differences, while divisions from the point of view of words are both divisible and not divisible.

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+ How one substance becomes manifold -
एगदवियम्मि जे अत्थपज्जया वयणपज्जया वावि ।
तीयाणागयभूया तावइयं तं हवइ दव्वं ॥31॥

Meaning : One and the same substance assumes various forms from various standpoints; for instance from the standpoint of past, present and future it becomes three-fold subjecting itself to Artha Paryaya. In the same manner, it assumes manifold forms from Vyanjana Paryaya point of view.

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+ An illustration of a Vyanjana Paryāya -
पुरिसम्मि पुरिससद्दो जम्माई मरणकालपज्जन्तो ।
तस्स उ बालाईया पन्जवजोया बहुवियप्पा ॥32॥

Meaning : A man is termed as a man from the time of his birth to the time of his death. Boy and youth and other are mere modifications of that same Purusa (man).

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अत्थि त्ति णिव्वियप्पं पुरिसं जो भणइ पुरिसकालम्मि ।
सो बालाइवियप्पं न लहइ तुल्लं व पावेज्जा ॥33॥

Meaning : If the Vyanjana Paryaya a man (Purusa) is considered absolutely as one indivisible, it would mean that it admits of no subdivisions or subvariations. But such a supposition would mean that even the variation of a man is not possible.

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+ Clear distinction between Vyanjana Paryaya and Artha Paryaya -- -
वंजणपज्जायस्स उ 'पुरिसो' 'पुरिसो' त्ति णिच्चमवियप्पो ।
बालाइवियप्पं पुण पासई से अत्थपज्जाओ ॥34॥

Meaning : To a man who looks from Vyanjana Paryaya point of view, a man-variation appears to be one, without any particular, simply a man. If, however, he looks at the subvariations of 'a boy', 'a youth' etc. it means he is looking from an Artha Paryaya point of view.

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+ Exclusiveness of a viewpoint is always faulty and unscientific -- -
सवियप्प-णिव्वियप्पं इय पुरिसं जो भणेज्ज अवियप्पं ।
सवियप्पमेव वा णिच्छएण ण स निच्छिओ समए ॥35॥

Meaning : Thus when in fact a man is both devoid of subdivisions and endowed with subdivisions to say that he is absolutely devoid of subdivisions or to say that he is nothing but subdivisions is faulty and unscientific.

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+ Main feature of the Sapta-bhangi or the Heptagonic forms of ontological enquiry -
अत्थंतरभूएहि य णियएहि य दोहि समयमाईहिं ।
वयणविसेसाईयं दव्वमवत्तव्वयं पडइ ॥36॥
अह देसो सब्भावे देसोऽसब्भावपज्जवे णियओ ।
तं दवियमत्थि णत्थि य आएसविसेसियं जम्हा ॥37॥
सब्भावे आइट्ठो देसो देसो य उभयहा जस्स ।
तं अत्थि अवत्तव्वं च होइ दविअं वियप्पवसा ॥38॥
आइट्ठोऽसब्भावे देसो देसो य उभयहा जस्स ।
तं णत्थि अवत्तव्वं च होइ दवियं वियप्पवसा ॥39॥
सब्भावाऽसब्भावे देसो देसो य उभयहा जस्स ।
तं अत्थि णत्थि अवत्तव्वयं च दवियं वियप्पवसा ॥40॥

Meaning : If we desire to describe a thing simultaneously from the standpoint of its own particularising elements and the particularising elements of another thing, it baffles description and is said to be indescribable.
If we desire to say that a thing partly exists from one point of view (or in a cartain sense) and does not exist from another point of view -- that thing is said to exist and not to exist. (38) If we desire to say that one part of a thing exists and another exists and does not exist at the same time the thing is said to be existing and indescribable.
If we desire to say that one part of a certain thing does not exist and another part does and does not exist at the same time, the thing is said to be not existing and indescribable.
If one part of a thing does and does not exist and another does and does not exist at the same time -- the thing is said to be existing, not existing and indescribable."

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+ Distribution of these seven modes between Artha-paryaya and Vyanjana-paryaya -- -
एवं सत्तवियप्पो वयणपहो होइ अत्थपज्जाए ।
वंजणपज्जाए उण सवियप्पो णिव्वियप्पो य ॥41॥

Meaning : All these seven modes of stating a thing are possible in Artha Paryaya, but in Vyanjana Paryaya those statements that deal with the divisibe (Savikalpa) aspects of a thing as well as its indivisible aspects are possible.

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+ Paryayarthika-naya does not cover the whole truth. -
जह दवियमप्पियं तं तहेव अस्थि त्ति पज्जवणयस्स ।
ण य स समयपन्नवणा पज्जवणयमेत्तपडिपुण्णा ॥42॥

Meaning : Paryayarthika-naya maintains that the modification which a thing undergoes at a particular time is its real nature. But this view of Paryayarthika since it does not take into consideration the substance (underlying the modifications) does not cover the whole truth as propagated by Jains.

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पडिपुण्णजोव्वणगुणो जह लज्जइ बालभावचरिएण ।
कुणइ य गुणपणिहाणं अणागयसुहोवहाणत्थं ॥43॥

Meaning : A man who has attained his youth is ashamed of the activities of his childhood and at the same time longs to have those qualities that would contribute to his future happiness.

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+ What in reality is the intrinsic nature of a man? -
ण य होइ जोव्वणत्थो बालो अण्णो वि लज्जइ ण तेण ।
ण वि य अणागयवयगुणपसाहणं जुज्जइ विभत्ते ॥44॥
जाइ-कुल-रूव-लक्खण-सण्णा-संबंधओ अहिगयस्स ।
बालाइभावदिट्ठविगयस्स जह तस्स संबंधो ॥45॥
तेहिं अतीताणागयदोसगुणदुगुंछणऽब्भुवगमेहिं ।
तह बंध-मोक्ख-सुह-दुक्खपत्थणा होइ जीवस्स ॥46॥

Meaning : A man who is in his youth cannot be regarded as merely a child. He is something else than a mere child. But at the same time he cannot be considered as altogether different from a child for if he is so, how can he be ashamed of the indiscretions of his childhood ? In the same manner if the young man is entirely different from the old man which he is likely to be in future, we can not account for endeavour in securing qualities for his future. He, therefore, must be considered as identical with the old man in future.
Thus the man appears to be one and the same on account of the abiding characteristics of caste, family, form, qualities, name and others while the same man appears to be changing or perishing on account of his different states such as childhood, youth and old age. Moreover on account of his sense of shame his past mistakes and preference for the qualities in future, the man must be considered as one and the same person in all states and at all times.
Exactly similar is the case with the soul. Like the man in the above illustration, it must be considered as one, as well as many, the same as well as different - when we look at it with reference to bondage and liberation and happiness and misery etc.

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+ The soul and the matter are from one point of view - one and from another point of view different -
अण्णोण्णाणुगयाणं 'इमं व तं व' त्ति विभयणमजुत्तं ।
जह दुद्ध-पाणियाणं जावंत विसेसपज्जाया ॥47॥
रूआइपज्जवा जे देहे जीवदवियम्मि सुद्धम्मि ।
ते अण्णोण्णाणुगया पण्णवणिज्जा भवत्थम्मि ॥47॥

Meaning : As it is impossible to separate milk from water when they both are intermingled with each other, similarly it is neither possible nor logical to separate two things (such as the soul and the matter in the present case) when they are inextricably blended together or when one permeates the other. No one can point out in such cases, that this is one thing and this another. It is not possible to distribute the Paryayas of a composite thing into its component parts.
All the modifications in a body such as form and others should be described as inextricably mixed together. Similarly in the case of the soul all the attributes of it in the state of its temporal existence should be described as interpenetrating.

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+ How things are philosophically termed when this intermingling of the soul and matter is taken into consideration -
एवं 'एगे आया एगे दंडे य होइ किरिया य' ।
करणविसेसेण य तिविहजोगसिद्धी वि अविरुद्धा ॥49॥

Meaning : This being the case "One soul, one Activity (danda) and one Action is established." And it is also not contradictory to say a three fold yoga is possible on the strength of different media (Karanas).

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+ Why a particular principle or element is said to be internal and why another is said to be external -
ण य बाहिरओ भावो अब्भंतरओ य अस्थि समयम्मि ।
णोइंदियं पुण पड्डञ्च होइ अब्भंतरविसेसो ॥50॥

Meaning : In reality, there is no such division as external or internal; but internality depends upon mind.

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+ What, then, is the standpoint of each Naya with reference to the soul and matter ? -
दव्वट्ठियस्स आया बंधइ कम्मं फलं च वेएइ ।
बीयस्स भावमेत्तं ण कुणइ ण य कोइ वेएइ ॥51॥
दव्वट्ठियस्स जो चेव कुणइ सो चेव वेयए णियमा ।
अण्णो करेइ अण्णो परिभुंजइ पज्जवणयस्स ॥52॥

Meaning : According to the standpoint of Dravyastikanaya the soul does exist and therefore it is bound by Karma and gets the fruit of this bondage of Karma. According to Paryayastika on the other hand, there is nothing except creation. Neither, therefore, is anything bound or gets fruit of the bondage.
According to the view of Dravyastika whosoever does any thing, necessarily gets the fruit of it himself. According to the view of Paryayastika, however, some one does an act and another receives the fruit of that act.

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+ Jaina viewpoint -
जे वयणिज्जवियप्पा संजुज्जंतेसु होन्ति एएसु ।
सा ससमयपण्णवणा 'तित्थयराऽऽसायणा अण्णा ॥53॥

Meaning : The right Jaina view consists of the combination of these two Nayas with all their attendant statements.

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+ even in Jaina view mentioned there is a place for exception -
पुरिसज्जायं तु पडुच जाणओ पण्णवेज्ज अण्णयरं ।
परिकम्मणाणिमित्तं दाएही सो विसेसं पि ॥54॥

Meaning :  A wise speaker sometimes places before his audience even one of the two Nayas having regard to their various mental levels. - For that speaker is justified in stating one particular standpoint of one Naya only, with a view to lead them in the long run to all-comprehensive truth.

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ज्ञानमीमांसा



+ Difference between Gyana (knowledge) from Darsana (perception) -- -
जं सामण्णग्गहणं दंसणमेयं विसेसियं णाणं ।
दोण्ह वि णयाण एसो पाडेक्कं अत्थपज्जाओ ॥1॥

Meaning : Perception is the cognition of the general and knowledge means the cognition of the particular. This is the import of the two Nayas respectively.

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+ How far one and the same thing appears different at the time of its perception and at the time of its knowledge -- -
दव्वट्ठिओ वि होऊण दंसणे पज्जवट्ठिओ होइ ।
उवसमियाईभावं पडुच्च णाणे उ विवरीयं ॥2॥

Meaning : At the time of perception i.e. from the Dravyastika point of view the soul appears in its general aspect. But even then (i.e. at the time of perception) it is with its particular attributes also when its quality of Upasama is concerned. Exactly otherwise does the soul appear when viewed from Paryayastika point of view; but even then, though it seems to appear with its particular aspects only, it maintains at the same time its general character also.

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+ As a rule these two cognitions-perception and knowledge-do not occur or take place at one and the same time, but even this rule has its limitation -
मणपज्जवणाणंतो णाणस्स य दरिसणस्स य विसेसो ।
केवलणाणं पुण दसणं ति णाणं ति य समाणं ॥3॥

Meaning : This rule of separate time for the two cognitions, perception and knowledge, holds good upto the knowledge called Manahparyaya (thought-reading of others). But in the case of the highest kind of knowledge called Kevala Jnana (the supreme or the absolute knowledge) no such separate time for perception and knowledge is necessary; for these two cognitions syncronize in Kevala Jnana (absolute knowledge). In fact at this stage, perception and knowledge are one and the same.

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+ the view of -- the consecutiveness of perception and knowledge which is based on Agama -
केई भणंति "जइया जाणइ तइया ण पासइ जिणो" त्ति ।
सुत्तमवलंबमाणा तित्थयरासायणाऽभीरू ॥4॥

Meaning : Some Acaryas (Jain preceptors) who are afraid, lest they violate the command of Tirthankara the holy guide and who consequently, depend on the Sutra view of the matter say that whenever the omniscient that is the holy guide comprehends a thing that is to say knows a thing in its particular form, he does not look at the general character of the thing.

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+ Introduction to Sahavadipaksa (the view of simultaneousness ) to criticise the Kramavadi-paksa. -
केवलणाणावरणक्खयजायं केवलं जहा णाणं ।
तह दंसणं पि जुज्जइ णियआवरणक्खयस्संते ॥5॥
भण्णइ खीणावरणे जह मइणाणं जिणे ण संभवइ ।
तह खीणावरणिज्जे विसेसओ दंसणं नत्थि ॥6॥
सुत्तम्मि चेव साई अपज्जवसियं ति केवलं वुत्तं ।
सुत्तासायणभीरूहि तं च दट्ठव्वयं होइ ॥7॥
संतम्मि केवले दंसणम्मि णाणस्स संभवो णत्थि ।
केवलणाणम्मि य दंसणस्स तम्हा सणिहणाइं ॥८॥

Meaning : When the obstruction in the way of absolute knowledge is completely removed, absolute knowledge springs up as a matter of course. Similarly when the obstruction in the path of absolute perception is completely removed, absolute perception springs forth as a matter of course.
It is said that as sensuous knowledge is not possible in the case of a man with absolute knowledge when the obstructions in his path are completely removed, in the same manner perception at a time different from that of knowledge is not possible in a man, all the obstructions in whose path are absolutely removed.
The Sutra expressly says that absolute knowledge or perception has beginning but no end. Those who have any regard for the commandment (i.e. import) of the Sutra must pause and ponder over the Sutra.
If we persist in saying that at the time of absolute perception, knowledge is not possible, and that, at the time of absolute knowledge, perception is not possible, it would mean that both have end, but this is absurd, since we already know from the Satra that both are endless).

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+ the Siddhantavadi (author) first questions his opponent and then introduces his own viewpoint -
दंसणणाणावरणक्खए समाणम्मि कस्स पुव्वअरं ।
होज्ज समं उप्पाओ हंदि दुए णत्थि उवओगा ॥9॥

Meaning : If the removal of obstruction, in the case of both perception and knowledge, is common, which of the two will spring forth perception first or knowledge first ? To this question this must be the only answer that both spring forth simultaneously. In fact, both are not different from each other.

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+ Author charges his opponent with the following faults (in argument) -
जइ सव्वं सायारं जाणइ एक्कसमएण सव्वण्णू ।
जुज्जइ सयावि एवं अहवा सव्वं ण याणाइ ॥10॥
परिसुद्धं सायारं अवियत्तं दंसणं अणायारं ।
ण य खीणावरणिज्जे जुज्जइ सुवियत्तमवियत्तं ॥11॥
अद्दिट्ठं अण्णायं च केवली एव भासइ सया वि ।
एगसमयम्मि हंदी वयणवियप्पो न संभवइ ॥12॥
अण्णायं पासंतो अद्दिट्ठं च अरहा वियाणंतो ।
किं जाणइ किं पासइ कह सव्वण्णु त्ति वा होइ ॥13॥
केवलणाणमणंतं जहेव तह दंसणं पि पण्णत्तं ।
सागारग्गहणा हि य णियमपरित्तं अणागारं ॥14॥

Meaning : If you say that the omniscient comprehends in deeper details all physical things at one and the same time, you must admit that it is so at all times, otherwise there is no meaning in his omniscience.
Granted that the knowledge is distinct and that the perception is indistinct but in the case of a person whose knowledgeobstructions are absolutely removed there is no such thing as distinct or indistinct.
The omniscient, at all times, speaks of things unperceived and unknown-you will have to grant this and if you do so, you will not be able to account for the belief that the omniscient preaches a thing which is both known and perceived at one and the same time.
What can an omniscient know and perceive if he is said to be perceiving what is unknown and knowing what is unperceived ? If such is the case, how can he claim omniscience !
In the scriptures, both knowledge and perception are said to be endless. But if we make a distinction between perception and knowledge, the former has necessarily a limited province.

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+ Kramavadi tries to defend himself but is finally silenced by the author -
भण्णइ जह चउणाणी जुज्जइ णियमा तहेव एयं पि ।
भण्णइ ण पंचणाणी जहेव अरहा तहेयं पि ॥15॥

Meaning : Kramavadi says - As it is in the case of a person who is said to possess four kinds of knowledge so also it is the case here. To this the Author says :-As the omniscient can not be said to be the possessor of five fold knowledge so also it is the case here.

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+ Author explains the illustration given in the preceding verse and establishes finally his own views -
पण्णवणिज्जा भावा समत्तसुयणाणदंसणा विसओ ।
ओहिमणपज्जवाण उ अण्णोण्णविलक्खणा विसओ ॥१६॥
तम्हा चउव्विभागो जुज्जइ ण उ णाणदंसणजिणाणं ।
सयलमणावरणमणंतमक्खयं केवलं जम्हा ॥१७॥

Meaning : That kind of knowledge, which is called Sruta i.e, heard or studied, deals with things that can be stated or mentioned by means of words. While the provinces of Avadhi and Manahparyaya kinds of knowledge are things altogether distinct and different in each kind. All these things are limited and may yield to some sort of classification or division.
But in the case of knowledge, and perception of a Kevalin unlike the four kinds of knowledge no division is possible. For that knowledge and perception are absolute, perfect, endless and imperishable.

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+ Verse 18th wipes out scriptural inconsistencies -
परवत्तव्वयपक्खा अविसिट्ठा तेसु तेसु सुत्तेसु ।
अत्थगईअ उ तेसिं वियंजणं जाणओ कुणइ ॥18॥

Meaning : In some of the Sutras apparently it seems that the views of Krama-vada and Sahavada are mentioned and supported but it is for the wise to see that these Sutras are interpreted in their proper spirit (that is in a way in which they are shown to be in agreement with the view of oneness).

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+ Author removes all the doubts as regards his own view -
जेण मणोविसयगयाण दंसणं णत्थि दव्वजायाण ।
तो मणपज्जवणाणं णियमा णाणं तु णिद्दिट्ठं ॥19॥

Meaning : In as much as there is no Perception (Darsana) of substance that is the object of Manah-paryaya, it is exclusively said to be Gyana and not perception.

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+ Another reason as to why one Absolute knowledge is said to be twofold -
चक्खुअचक्खुअवहिकेवलाण समयम्मि दंसणविअप्पा ।
परिपढिया केवलणाणदंसणा तेण ते अण्णा ॥20॥

Meaning : In the sastra Darsana is divided into Caksu, Achaksu, Avadhi and Kevala. From this division we can say that Gyana and Darsana are different.

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+ Following two verses describe the partial view (Ekadesi) -
दंसणमोग्गहमेत्तं 'घडो' त्ति णिव्वण्णणा हवइ णाणं ।
जह एत्थ केवलाण वि विसेसणं एत्तियं चेव ॥21॥
दंसणपुव्वं णाणं णाणणिमित्तं तु दंसणं णत्थि ।
तेण सुविणिच्छियामो दंसणणाणाण अण्णत्तं ॥22॥

Meaning : Just as all Avagraha is Darsana and definite comprehension of a thing such as 'This is a jar' is knowledge, in the same manner, definite and indefinite apprehension is the differentiating factor between Absolute knowledge and Absolute perception.
Perception necessarily precedes knowledge but knowledge never precedes perception. It can, therefore, be definitely: asserted that, in a Kevalin, knowledge and perception are not different from each other.

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+ Illustration given by the Ekadesi objector -
जइ ओग्गहमेत्तं दंसणं ति मण्णसि विसेसिअं णाणं ।
मइणाणमेव दंसणमेवं सइ होइ निप्फण्णं ॥23॥
एवं सेसिंदियदंसणम्मि नियमेण होइ ण य जुत्तं ।
अह तत्थ णाणमेत्तं घेप्पइ चक्खुम्मि वि तहेव ॥24॥

Meaning : If you say that all Avagraha is Darsana and comprehending the particulars of a thing is Gyana (knowledge) then it follows that Mati-Gyana alone is Darsana (perception).
The same must be said of all the rest of the senses as regards Darsana. But this is absurd. Now if in the case of objects of other senses, only knowledge is accepted the same must be accepted in the case of the objects of sight.

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+ Siddhanti defines clearly the term Darsana -
णाणं अप्पुट्ठे अविसए य अत्थम्मि दंसणं होइ ।
मोत्तूण लिंगओ जं अण्णागयाईयविसएसु ॥25॥

Meaning : Darshana is that kind of knowledge which takes place as regards things untouched and which do not come within proper province. This cognition does not admit in its fold that knowledge which takes place by virtue of Hetu (the middle term) as regards things that are to happen in future and other things.

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+ Over-absurdity (Atiprasanga) avoided -
मणपज्जवणाणं दंसणं ति तेणेह होइ ण य जुत्तं ।
भण्णइ णाणं णोइंदियम्मि ण घडादयो जम्हा ॥26॥

Meaning : According to the aforesaid definition Manahparyaya is Darsana ; but it is not so. It is laid down that proper province of this knowledge is Mind which is technically called No-indriya. The jars etc. are excluded from its sphere.

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+ Further explanation regarding accepted arrangement -
मइसुयणाणणिमित्तो छउमत्थे होइ अत्थउवलंभो ।
एगयरम्मि वि तेसिं ण दंसणं दसणं कत्तो ? ॥27॥

Meaning : In the case of Chadmasthas, Mati and Sruta-Gyana are the two things responsible for arriving at a cognition of categories. If there is nothing like Mati-darsana or Sruta-darsana, how then Darsana is at all possible ?

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+ Why Sruta-Gyana is not Darsana ? -
जं पञ्चक्खग्गहणं ण इन्ति सुयणाणसम्मिया अत्था ।
तम्हा दंसणसद्दो ण होइ सयले वि सुयणाणे ॥28॥

Meaning : The term Darsana cannot be applied to sruta-gyana because the things conceived by sruta-gyana cannot be directly conceived.

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+ Arrangement of Avadhi-darsana -
जं अप्पुट्ठा भावा ओहिण्णाणस्स होंति पच्चक्खा ।
तम्हा ओहिण्णाणे दंसणसद्दो वि उवउत्तो ॥29॥

Meaning : There can be also Avadhi-darsana because by Avadhi-gyana things though untouched are directly comprehended. It means that as there is Avadhi-gyana there is also Avadhi-darsana.

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+ Both Gyana and Darsana can simultaneously fit in with Kevala-upayoga which is only one -
जं अप्पुट्ठे भावे जाणइ पासइ य केवली णियमा ।
तम्हा तं णाणं दंसणं च अविसेसओ सिद्धं ॥30॥

Meaning : Gyana and Darsana can remain simultaneously without distinction as we see in the case of a perfect being who as a rule perceives and knows the objects simultanecously.

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+ Contradiction evidenced in Canonical literature avoided -
साई अपज्जवसियं ति दो वि ते ससमयओ हवइ एवं ।
परतित्थयवत्तव्वं च एगसमयंतरुप्पाओ ॥31॥

Meaning : According to real Jaina doctrines both Gyana and Darsana have a beginning but no end. This being the case a doctrine which formulates that there is an interval of one Samaya between the productions of both of them should not be accepted as a real Jaina Doctrine.

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+ Explanation of Darsana when used in the sense of faith -
एवं जिणपण्णत्ते सद्दहमाणस्स भावओ भावे ।
पुरिसस्साभिणिबोहे दंसणसद्दो हवइ जुत्तो ॥32॥
सम्मण्णाणे णियमेण दंसणं दसणे उ भयणिज्जं ।
सम्मण्णाणं च इमं ति अत्थओ होइ उववण्णं ॥33॥

Meaning : Darsana is to be strictly confined to that process of knowledge, which is styled as crude impression (Abhinibodha), of one who looks at all things described by Jinas with unquestionable faith.
When there is Samyag-gyana, there is Samyag-Darsana always but the converse is not true.

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+ Mention of a delusion created by the word Sadi-aparyavasita and its removal -
केवलणाणं साई अपज्जवसियं ति दाइयं सुत्ते ।
तेत्तियमित्तोत्तूणा केइ विसेसं ण इच्छंति ॥34॥
जे संघयणाईया भवत्थकेवलिविसेसपज्जाया ।
ते सिज्ज्ञमाणसमये ण होंति विगयं तओ होइ ॥35॥
सिद्धत्तणेण य पुणो उप्पण्णो एस अत्थपज्जाओ ।
केवलभावं तु पडुच्च केवलं दाइयं सुत्ते ॥36॥

Meaning : Some do not recognize Visesa which means a modificatory change because they have become reckless on account of the sutra which is to the effect that perfect knowledge is without an end but not without a beginning.
Those particular conditions such as bodily frame etc. which exist in a perfect being -- Kevali who is still not a Siddha do not remain as entities when he attains Siddhatva. It means, then, Kevala is destroyed.
Moreover, this Artha-paryaya, which is just like absolute knowledge, comes into being in the form of Siddhatva. With reference to Kevala-Bhava the sutra declares that it is without an end.

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+ Doubt as to the difference between Jiva and Kevala and its removal through example -
जीवो अणाइणिहणो केवलणाणं तु साइयमणंतं ।
इअ थोरम्मि विसेसे कह जीवो केवलं होइ ॥37॥
तम्हा अण्णो जीवो अण्णे णाणाइपज्जवा तस्स ।
उवसमियाईलक्खणविसेसओ केइ इच्छन्ति ॥38॥
अह पुण पुव्वपयुत्तो अत्थो एगंतपक्खपडिसेहे ।
तह वि उयाहरणमिणं ति हेउपडिजोअणं वोच्छं ॥39॥
जह कोई सट्ठिवरिसो तीसइवरिसो णराहिवो जाओ ।
उभयत्थ जायसद्दो वरिसविभागं विसेसेई ॥40॥
एवं जीवद्दव्वं अणाइणिहणमविसेसियं जम्हा ।
रायसरिसो उ केवलिपज्जाओ तस्स सविसेसो ॥41॥
जीवो अणाइनिहणो 'जीव' त्ति य णियमओ ण वत्तव्वो ।
जं पुरिसाउयजीवो देवाउयजीवियविसिट्ठो ॥42॥

Meaning : Soul is Anadi-nidhana and perfect knowledge has a beginning and no end. Thus there being a gulf of difference, how can soul become Kevala-rupa.
Therefore, some believe that soul is different due to the differences in characteristics such as Aupasamika etc. and its modificatory changes such as Jnana etc. are also different.
This has been referred to before while controverting Ekanta-paksa. Still, however, I am inclined to cite an example which points to the relationship between Sadhya and Hetu (Major Term and Middle Term).
Just as the word 'became' in 'A sixty years old man became a king at the age of thirty show's a difference in years."
So also Jiva-dravya without any Visesa is Anadinidhana. Thus a Kevala paryaya just as Raja (in the above example) is a visesa and nothing more.
We cannot make this one-sided statement that the eternal soul is soul and nothing else, that is to say, it is in a general form and none else. Because a soul embodied in a man's frame is treated as different from a soul embodied in a god's frame.

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+ Corroboration of difference in the same modificatory change -
संखेज्जमसंखेज्जं अणंतकप्पं च केवलं णाणं ।
तह रागदोसमोहा अण्णे वि य जीवपज्जाया ॥43॥

Meaning : Kevala-gyana (Perfect knowledge) is threefold:-Sankhyata (measurable), Asankhyata (immeasurable) and Ananta (infinite or endless). In the same fashion Raga (attachment), Dvesa (hatred) and Moha (infatuation) are also the non-essential modificatory changes of the Jiva (Soul).

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ज्ञेयमीमांसा



+ Mutual identity of the general and the particular -
सामण्णम्मि विसेसो विसेसपक्खे य वयणविणिवेसो ।
दव्वपरिणाममणणं दाएइ तयं च णियमेइ ॥1॥
एगतणिव्विसेसं एयंतविसेसियं च वयमाणो ।
दव्वस्स पज्जवे पज्जवा हि दवियं णियत्तेइ ॥2॥

Meaning : Sometimes the particular is mentioned with reference to the general, while sometimes the general is mentioned with reference to the particular. Such mixed references go to prove that apart from the general there is such a thing as its particular that is different from it or from its transformation, however, that particular is in no way different from the general.
A person who refers exclusively to the general divests it of its particulars; similarly a person who talks of the particulars exclusively divorces them from their general.

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+ Pratitya (authentic) vachana -
पच्चुप्पण्णं भावं विगयभविस्सेहिं जं सम्मण्णेइ ।
एयं पडुच्चवयणं दव्वंतरणिस्सियं जं च ॥3॥
दव्वं जहा परिणयं तहेव अस्थि त्ति तम्मि समयम्मि ।
विगयभविस्सेहि उ पज्जएहिं भयणा विभयणा वा ॥4॥

Meaning : Those words that connect the present change of a thing with its past and future changes and those words that synthetise the general running through all the individuals are words that are reliable or authentic.
Because although the present change of a certain thing apparently has not any relation to the changes of that thing in past or in future still the truth is that the present change has definitely a relation with the past and future changes of that thing.

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+ How the attributes of existence as well as of non-existence are possible in one and the same thing -
परपज्जवेहिं असरिसगमेहिं णियमेण णिञ्चमवि नत्थि ।
सरिसेहिं पि वंजणओ अस्थि ण पुणऽत्थपज्जाए ॥5॥
पच्चुप्पण्णम्मि वि पज्जयम्मि भयणागइं पडइ दव्वे ।
जं एगगुणाईया अणंतकप्पा गमविसेसा ॥6॥

Meaning : Every thing is non-existent from the standpoint of dissimilar particulars that are absolutely different from the thing. Even among things that are similar a thing exists from Vyanjana-paryaya point of view and does not exist from Arthaparyaya point of view.
Even as regards the present state a substance is both different and not different from it. For the degrees of qualities range from one to infinity.

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+ Both difference and sameness can reside in one and the same person -
कोवं उप्पायंतो पुरिसो जीवस्स कारओ होइ ।
तत्तो विभएयव्वो परम्मि सयमेव भइयव्वो ॥7॥

Meaning : A person, who on account of his passions in the present life, which becomes a cause of his future life is obviously different from person in the next birth, for cause and effect are different from each other. But on the other hand the person who exists at present will be the same person in his next birth. From this point of view, therefore, the person in his present as well as future life is identical.

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+ discussion of the oneness or otherwise of a substance & and its attributes. The author first of all mentions the viewpoint of his opponent -
रूव-रस-गंध-फासा असमाणग्गहण-लक्खणा जम्हा ।
तम्हा दव्वाणुगया गुण त्ति ते केइ इच्छंति ॥8॥

Meaning : Some people think that attributes or qualities of a substance are different from the substance and depend upon the subs. tance because these attributes of colour, smell, touch, taste are comprehended by means other than those by which a substance is different from those of its attributes.

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+ With a view to refute this view-point the author in the following verse first of all tries to establish an identity between attributes and transformations of a substance -
दूरे ता अण्णत्तं गुणसद्दे चेव ताव पारिच्छं ।
किं पज्जवाहिओ होज्ज पज्जवे चेवगुणसण्णा ॥9॥
दो उण णया भगवया दवट्ठिय-पज्जवट्ठिया नियया ।
एत्तो य गुणविसेसे गुणट्ठियणओ वि जुज्जंतो ॥10॥
जं च पुण अरिहया तेसु तेसु सुत्तेसु गोयमाईणं ।
पज्जवसण्णा णियया वागरिया तेण पज्जाया ॥11॥
परिगमणं पज्जाओ अणेगकरणं गुण त्ति तुल्लत्था ।
तह वि ण 'गुण' त्ति भण्णइ पज्जवणयदेसणा जम्हा ॥12॥
जंपन्ति अत्थि समये एगगुणो दसगुणो अणंतगुणो ।
रूवाई परिणामो भएणइ तम्हा गुणविसेसो ॥13॥
गुणसद्दमंतरेणावि तं तु पज्जवविसेससंखाणं ।
सिज्झइ णवरं संखाणसत्थधम्मो 'तइगुणो' त्ति ॥14॥
जह दससु दसगुणम्मि य एगम्मि दसत्तणं समं चेव ।
अहियम्मि वि गुणसद्दे तहेय एयं पि दट्ठव्वं ॥15॥

Meaning : Let alone the difference between substance and quality. First we have to consider whether the words Guna and Paryaya are used in different senses or are used as synonyms ?
Lord Mahavira has once for all acknowledged only two points of views namely Dravyastika and Paryayastika; now if the idea of Guna would have been altogether different from the idea of Paryaya, He would have certainly admitted a third viewpoint namely that of Gunastika.
But in as much as Lord Mahavira, in various sutras addressed to Gautama and others, has fixed the comotation of Paryaya and has explained that word, it must be said that the real thing is Paryaya that is to say Gunas are not different from Paryayas.
Paryayas are those that subject a thing to various transformations and Gunas are those that make a thing assume various forms. Both these words are synonyms but the words are not interchangeable for the word Paryaya is propagated by Lord Mahavira, but He has not used the word Gunastika.
Some say that in Agamas the transformation of colour is mentioned as onefold (Eka-guna) black, tenfold black, infinitefold black. It is therefore clear that there is a difference between Guna and Paryaya.
To this the author replies :-The word Guna when applied with reference to colour as well as the degree of colour is used to show the number of peculiar transformations. It does not signify, Gunastika. Here the word Guna is purely numerical and nothing else.
As tenness is common in ten things or tenfold one thing. In the same manner we should understand in the case of one fold, twofold black etc.

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+ Arguments of the person who regard a subsance and its quality as absolutely identical -
एयंतपक्खवाओ जो उण दव्व-गुण-जाइभेयम्मि ।
अह पुव्वपडिक्कुट्ठो उआहरणमित्तमेयं तु ॥16॥
पिउ-पुत्त-णत्तु-भव्वय-भाऊणं एगपुरिससंबंधो ।
ण य सो एगस्स पिय त्ति सेसयाणं पिया होइ ॥17॥
जह संबंधविसिट्ठो सो पुरिसो पुरिसभावणिरइसओ ।
तह दव्वमिंदियगयं रूवाइविसेसणं लहई ॥18॥

Meaning : We have already refuted the opinion that there is absolute difference between a substance and its quality. Here we want to give an illustration which will corroborate the identity of a substance and its quality.
We have to regard that a father, a son, a grandson, a nephew or a brother has different relation with one and the same person. For, a person who is a father to one cannot be a father to all.
Just as a man though of the same form appears to be different from the standpoint of different persons, in the same manner the same substance when perceived by different persons appears to assume different aspects such as colour etc. That is to say it is mentioned as various particular things or attributes.

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+ Upon this the author objects in the following verse thus -
होज्जाहि दुगुणमहुरं अणंतगुणकालयं तु जं दव्वं ।
रण उ डहरओ महल्लो व होइ संबंधओ पुरिसो ॥19॥

Meaning : That a certain substance is double that of another or that it is infinitefold black of another substance does not depend merely on its relation to other things. Similarly that a person is either great or small does not depend merely on his relation to other persons.

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+ Person holding the view of absolute identity defends his own position thus -
भण्णइ संबंधवसा जइ संबंधित्तणं अणुमयं ते ।
णणु संबंधविसेसे संबंधिविसेसणं सिद्धं ॥20॥

Meaning : We say if you once admit a general relation of a thing owing to its being related in general to other things, why should you have any difficulty in allowing same particular relation of a thing with another thing with which it is related in a particular way?

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+ To this the author replies in the following verse -
जुज्जइ संबंधवसा संबंधिविसेसणं ण उण एयं ।
णयणाइविसेसगओ रूवाइविसेसपरिणामो ॥२१॥

Meaning :  True that peculiar relation proceeds from peculiar relationship, but colour, smell and other transformations spring from the relation of the senses (with things) and so in this particular case the proposition stated above (as regards the peculiar relation) does not hold good.

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+ Both the argument of the complete identity and its refutation by the author -
भण्णइ विसमपरिणयं कह एयं होहिइ त्ति उवणीयं ।
तं होइ परणिमित्तं ण व त्ति एत्थऽत्थि एगंतो ॥22॥

Meaning : "We ask," says the person holding the view of absolute identity "the persons who regard substance and quality as different from each other this :-Is it possible for a substance to have various transformations ? For, we hold that a substance is one and unchangeable." To this the author replies by saying that the final opinion in this matter has been given by men of authority in Jaina Sastra and it is this that a substance undergoes and does not undergo various transformations owing to some exterior causes. Nothing absolutely or dogmatically can be said in this matter.

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+ The following verses analyse the difference of substance and quality as advanced by the persons holding the view of absolute difference and prove that the definitions of substance and quality, forwarded by him do not hold much water. -
दव्वस्स ठिई जम्म-विगमा य गुणलक्खणं ति वत्त्व्वं ।
एवं सइ केवलिणो जुज्जइ तं णो उ दवियस्स ॥23॥
दव्वत्थंतरभूया मुत्ताऽमुत्ता य ते गुणा होज्ज ।
जइ मुत्ता परमाणू णत्थि अमुत्तेसु अग्गहणं ॥24॥

Meaning : According to the view of absolute difference between substance and quality a substance is that which has a permanent state and a quality is that which is produced and which perishes. But the author objects to these definitions of substance and quality and says that the definitions would have been proper if substance would have been altogether different from quality and if quality would have been absolutely different from substance. But they cannot be applied to a substance and quality in one.
If qualities are regarded as absolutely different from a substance they are either corporeal (Murta) or incorporeal (Amurta). If they are corporeal then Paramanu (an atom) which is a substance and in which qualities are said to reside will also be corporeal for it is a repository of corporeal things. But the universally accepted characteristics of an atom is that it is incorporeal; while on the other hand qualities are regarded as incorporeal then they will never be known.

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+ The following two verses give the aim of the above discussion -
सीसमईविप्फारणमेत्तत्थोऽयं को समुल्लावो ।
इहरा कहामुहं चेव णत्थि एवं ससमयम्मि ॥25॥
ण वि अस्थि अण्णवादो ण वि तव्वाओ जिणोवएसम्मि ।
तं चेव य मण्णंता अवमण्णंता ण याणंति ॥26॥

Meaning : The digression in discussing things that do not form our subject matter is for the sake of sharpening the intellectual powers of the disciples. There is really speaking no room for all these discussions in Jaina Sastra.
Both the views of absolute difference and absolute identity, are not admitted by Jaina Sastra, Persons holding both these extreme views, not knowing the real nature of things, are totally ignorant.

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भयणा वि हु भइयव्वा जइ भयणा भयइ सव्वदव्वाइं ।
एवं भयणा णियमा वि होइ समयाविरोहेण ॥27॥
णियमेण सद्दहंतो छक्काए भावओ न सद्दहइ ।
हंदी अपज्जवेसु वि सद्दहणा होइ अविभत्ता ॥28॥

Meaning : s the doctrine of Anekanta shows all possible sides of a thing and thus does not postulate about a thing in any fixed way, in the same way Anekanta itself is also subject to this possibility of other side that is to say, it also sometimes assumes the form of onesidedness (Ekanta). The author admits that thus Anekanta may also become Ekanta if it does not go against the right view of things.
For instance, a man who pins his faith on the six Kayas does not really show the right sort of faith. Because thereby a sense of unity is imposed on disunity.

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गइपरिगयं गई चेव केइ णियमेण दवियमिच्छंति ।
तं पि य उड्ढ़गईयं तहा गई अन्नहा अगई ॥29॥
गुणणिव्वत्तियसण्णा एवं दहणादओ वि दट्ठव्वा ।
जं तु जहा पडिसिद्धं दव्वमदव्वं तहा होइ ॥30॥
कुंभो ण जीवदवियं जीवो वि ण होइ कुंभदवियं ति ।
तम्हा दो वि अदवियं अण्णोण्णविसेसिया होंति ॥31॥

Meaning : Some regard a thing moving upwards as decidedly full of motion. But though it is in motion from the standpoint of going up, it is also not in motion considering that it does not move downwards.
Similarly fire is fire because it burns. Dahana means one that burns i.e. fire. But in some cases fire cannot burn things that cannot, by their very nature, be burnt. Thus fire both burns and does not burn.
From the standpoint of a mere substance a jar does exist, but from the standpoint of sentient thing it does not exist. Similarly a sentient thing is not a thing from the standpoint of a jar.

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उप्पाओ दुवियप्पो पओगजणिओ य वीससा चेव ।
तत्थ उ पओगजणिओ समुदयवायो अपरिसुद्धो ॥32॥
साभाविओ वि समुदयकओ व्व एगंतिओ व्व होज्जाहि ।
आगासाईआणं तिण्हं परपच्चओऽणियमा ॥33॥
विगमस्स वि एस विही समुदयजणियम्मि सो उ दुवियप्पो ।
समुदयविभागमेत्तं अत्थंतरभावगमणं च ॥34॥

Meaning : Creation is of two kinds one natural and another brought about by special efforts (artificial). Artificial creation is known by the names of Samudaya-vada and ApariSuddha.
Natural creation is also of two kinds:-Samudaya-krta . and Aikatvika. Aikatvika creation (or rather onesided creation) is seen in Akasa, Dharma and Adharma. It is due to external causes and is not seen invariably.
The same is the case with destruction. It is of two kinds natural and artificial. It is also found in Samudayakrta creation in two ways. One is in the form of separation of aggregates and another is a destruction which is in the form of assuming quite a new form.

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+ Discussion of time-distinction etc. of origination, destruction and permanence. -
तिण्णि वि उप्पायाई अभिण्णकाला य भिण्णकाला य ।
अत्थंतरं अणत्थंतरं च दवियाहि णायव्वा ॥35॥
जो आउंचणकालो सो चेव पसारियस्स वि ण जुत्तो ।
तेसिं पुण पडिवत्ती-विगमे कालंतरं णत्थि ॥36॥
उप्पज्जमाणकालं उप्पण्णं ति विगयं विगच्छंतं ।
दवियं पण्णवयंतो तिकालविसयं विसेसेइ ॥37॥

Meaning : Time-limit of Utpada (origination) etc. is different from one another and also is not. So also they should be considered different and non-different from Dravya.
Time of extension is not the time of drawing in. And also, there is no interval between destruction and origination of extension and drawing in.
A particular Dravya is produced, is being produced and shall be produced; so also a particular Dravya is destroyed, is being destroyed and shall be dstroyed :-these two sets of speaking show nothing but particularizing that substance from three viewpoints of Time.

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दव्वंतरसंजोगाहि केचि दवियस्स बेंति उप्पायं ।
उप्पायत्थाऽकुसला विभागजायं ण इच्छंति ॥38॥
अणु दुअणुएहिं दव्वे आरद्धे 'तिअणुयं' ति ववएसो ।
तत्तो य पुण विभत्तो अणु त्ति जाओ आणू होइ ॥39॥
बहुयाण एगसद्दे जह संजोगाहि होइ उप्पाओ ।
णणु एगविभागम्मि वि जुज्जइ बहुयाण उप्पाओ ॥40॥
एगसमयम्मि एगदवियस्स बहुया वि होंति उप्पाया ।
उप्पायसमा विगमा ठिईउ उस्सग्गओ णियमा ॥41॥ काय-मण-वयण-किरिया-रूवाइ-गईविसेसओ वावि ।
संजोयभेयओ जाणणा य दवियस्स उप्पाओ ॥42॥

Meaning : Coming into existence of a new Dravya (substance) is described, by some, as a conjunction of one Dravya with the other. Disjunction cannot beget a new Dravya. These people are, it should be said, do not know the real nature of Utpatti (origination) because,-
It is customary to say "This is Anu" with respect to a Dravya consisting of two Paramanus (Dvyanuka) and also 'This is Tryanuka' in the case of a Dravya which is composed of many Dvyanukas. Moreover, when an Anu disunites from a Tryanuka, we say 'Anu is produced.'
If you believe that only conjunction is responsible for the origination of a new Dravya on the ground that word Eka (one) is used in the place of Bahu (many), then it is easy to show that by the division of one (Eka) many are produced.
In one Samaya (indivisible unit of time), one Dravya produces some times, many Utpadas, Sthitis and Vinasas.
Origination of a Dravya is the result of modifications of Sarira (body), Manas (mind), Vacana (speech), Kriya (action), Rupa (form), Gati (motion), Samyoga (conjunction), Bhedana (disjunction) and Gyana (knowledge).

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+ Distinction between dogmatic and rational scriptures -
दुविहो धम्मावाओ अहेउवाओ य हेउवाओ य ।
तत्थ उ अहेउवाओ भवियाऽभवियादओ भावा ॥43॥
भविओ सम्मद्दंसण-णाण-चरित्तपडिवत्तिसंपन्नो ।
णियमा दुक्खंतकडो त्ति लक्खणं हेउवायस्स ॥44॥
जो हेउवायपक्खम्मि हेउओ आगमे य आगमिओ ।
सो ससमयपण्णवओ सिद्धंतविराहओ अन्नो ॥45॥

Meaning : Agama (canon or canonical Literature) which propounds Religion, consists of Hetuvada (Rational portion) and Ahetuvada (dogmatic portion). Padarthas (categories) such as Bhavya and Abhavya etc. are the proper subjects for Ahetavada.
Bhavya according to Hetuvada removes or destroys all unhappiness through Right vision, Right knowledge and Right conduct.
He only is Aradhaka (propagator of right religion) who takes recourse to Hetu only when Hetuvada is to be discussed and relies on Agama when Agamavada is under discussion. One, who does not do this, is Viradhaka (heretic).

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+ Discussion of Naya-vada -
परिसुद्धो नयवाओ आगममेत्तत्थसाहओ होइ ।
सो चेव दुण्णिगिण्णो दोण्णि वि पक्खे विधम्मेइ ॥46॥
जावइया वयणवहा तावइया चेव होंति णयवाया ।
जावइया णयवाया तावइया चेव परसमया ॥47॥
जं काविलं दरिसणं एवं दव्वट्ठियस्स वत्तव्वं ।
सुद्धोअणतणअस्स उ परिसुद्धो पज्जवविअप्पो ॥48॥
दोहि वि णएहि णीअं सत्थमुलूएण तह वि मिच्छत्तं ।
जं सविसअप्पहाणतणेण अण्णोण्णणिरवेक्खा ॥49॥

Meaning : The only subject of pure Naya-vada (a system of view-points) is the exposition of the Canon. If it is not rightly applied, it spoils both purposes.
Naya-vada are as many in number as there are methods of putting the sentences. Para-samayas (heresies) also are so many as Naya-vadas.
Philosophy taught and promulgated by Kapila is nothing but a representation of Dravyastika-naya (Noumenal) and that which is taught by Buddha--the son of Suddhodana is an exposition of Paryayastika Naya (phenomenal) pure and simple.
Although the philosophical exposition is made by Kanada (who is also known by the name of Uluka) with reference to both the Nayas but it is full of fallacies because both the Nayas are made use of independently.

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+ Difference between Ekanta and Anekanta. standpoints in the case of Karya (effect) -
 जे संतवायदोसे सक्कोलूया भणंति संखाणं ।
संखा य असव्वाए तेसिं सव्वे वि ते सच्चा ॥50॥
ते उ भयणोवणीया सम्मद्दंसणमणुत्तरं होंति ।
जं भवदुक्खविमोक्खं दो वि न पूरेंति पाडिक्कं ॥51॥
नत्थि पुढविविसिट्टो 'घडो' त्ति जं तेण जुज्जइ अणण्णो ।
जं पुण 'घडो' त्ति पुव्वं ण आसि पुढवी तओ अण्णो ॥52॥

Meaning : Faults and Fallacies which are there according to Bauddhas and Vaisesikas in the Sadwada (theory of evolution) of Sankhya are all true and those of Asadvada Paksa. (theory of creation) of which the Bauddhas and Vaisesikas are accused hold also true.
When this Sadvada and Asadvada are adjusted according to Anekanta the result is Samyag-Darsana (Right vision), because they both are not severally able to liberate a man from the world.
The same reason, which proves the Jar not a separate entity from the earth, accounts for the fact that it is same as earth. And because the earth was not a pot before, it is also separate from it.

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+ Theories of causation? are Mithya (false) if they are based on Ekanta view-point and Samyak (true if they are grounded on Anekanta. -
कालो सहाव णियई पुव्वकयं पुरिसकारणेगंता ।
मिच्छत्तं ते चेवा (व) समासओ होंति सम्मत्तं ॥53॥

Meaning : Kala (Time), Svabhava (Nature), Niyati (Destiny), Purvakrta Adrsta (Unknown actions of the past) and Purusartha (Effort)all these five taken singly are false because they touch only one point. They all are true if they are made use of with reference to each other.

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+ Invalidity of Nastitva etc. six theories as regards "soul" -
णत्थि ण णिच्चो ण कुणइ कयं ण वेएइ णत्थि णिव्वाणं ।
णत्थि य मोक्खोवाओ छ म्मिच्छत्तस्स ठाणाइं ॥54॥
अत्थि अविणासधम्मी करेइ वेएइ अत्थि णिव्वाणं ।
अत्थि य मोक्खोवाओ छ स्सम्मत्तस्स ठाणाइं ॥55॥

Meaning : There is no soul; It is not eternal ; It does not do ; It does not experience ; It has no emancipation; and there is no remedy for emancipation, these six theories are receptacles of false knowledge.
There is soul; It is eternal : It does; It experiences; It can be liberated and there is a remedy for liberation -- all these six theories are abodes of right knowledge.

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+ Faults liable to crop up in the debate due to the absence of Anekanta Drsti -
साहम्मउ व्व अत्थं साहेज्ज परो विहम्मओ वा वि ।
अण्णोणं पडिकुट्ठा दोण्णवि एए असव्वाया ॥56॥
दव्वट्ठियवत्तव्वं सामण्णं पज्जवस्स य विसेसो ।
एए समोवणीआ विभज्जवायं विसेसेंति ॥57॥
हेउविसओवणीअं जह वयणिज्जं परो नियत्तेइ ।
जइ तं तहा पुरिल्लो दाइंतो केण जिव्वंतो ॥58॥
एयंताऽसब्भूयं सब्भूयमणिच्छियं च वयमांणो ।
लोइय-परिच्छियाणं वयणिज्जपहं पडइ वादी ॥59॥

Meaning : When Ekantavadi (Radicalist) establishes a conclusion by Sadharmya (Similari. ty; analogy) or Vaidharmya (dissimilarity), they both result in an Asadvada.
Noumenal view-point is concerned with Samanya (general) and Phenomenal view-point with Visesa (particular). When they are employed independently, they give rise to Radical view-point.
The opponent disproves the Sadhya (major term) which is going to be proved by Hetu (Middle term) because it has been put in an objectionable way. Who would have conquered the Vadi who has employed the major term as it ought to be employed ?
Vadi who speaks utter falsehood or who makes an indefinite statement even though it may be true, is accused by the examiners.

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+ A proper method to make an exposition of a Tattwa. (Reality) -
दव्वं खेत्तं कालं भावं पज्जाय-देस-संजोगे ।
भेदं च पडुच्च समा भावाणं पण्णवणपज्जा ॥60॥

Meaning : A proper exposition of Padarthas (categories) depends on Dravya (Substance), Ksetra (Space), Kala (Time), Bhava (modality), Paryaya (modificatory change), Desa (province), Samyoga (circumstances), and Bheda (distinction).

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+ Faults in a Sutra which is taken as perfect -
पाडेक्कनयपहगयं सुत्तं सुत्तहरसद्दसंतुट्ठा ।
अविकोवियसामत्था जहागमविभत्तपडिवत्ती ॥61॥
सम्मद्दंसणमिणमो सयलसमत्तवयणिज्जणिद्दोसं ।
अत्तुक्कोसविणट्ठा सलाहमाणा विणासेंति ॥62॥

Meaning : Those, who are satisfied by being called Satradhara (well-versed in Sutras) because they recite: Sutras which depend only on one Naya, remain devoid of capability indispensable to learned people. Their knowledge touches only words.
These boasters destroy Versatility, of view-points which takes a wholesale review and at the same time impede their spiritual progress.

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+ Important merits for the exposition of a Sastric lore -
ण हु सासणभत्तीमत्तएण सिद्धंतजाणओ होइ ।
ण वि जाणओ वि णियमा पण्णवणाणिच्छिओ णामं ॥63॥

Meaning : No one can come to possess the real knowledge of Siddhanta by mere devotion of the Canon. And also its knower as a rule is not entitled to make an exposition of the Sastras.

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+ Statement as to what should be done for the attainment of perfect knowledge of the realities -
सुत्तं अत्थनिमेणं न सुत्तमेत्तेण अत्थपडिवत्ती ।
अत्थगई उण णयवायगहणलीणा दुरभिगम्मा ॥64॥
तम्हा अहिगयसुत्तेण अत्थसंपायणम्मि जइयव्वं ।
आयरियधीरहत्था हंदि महाणं विलंवेन्ति ॥65॥

Meaning : Sutra is a receptacle of meaning. But mere Sutra does not yield meaning. Knowledge of a genuine meaning is difficult to be obtained as it is dependent on a complex Nayavada theory.
Therefore, those who know the Sutra, should try to get at the right meaning because the presumptuous and ignorant preceptors misinterpret the Sastras.

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+ Statement of faults which find place in outward show without serious thinking -
जह जह बहुस्सुओ सम्मओ य सिस्सगणसंपरिवुडो य ।
अविणिच्छिओ य समए तह तह सिद्वंतपडिणीओ ॥66॥
चरणकरणप्पहाणा ससमय-परसमयमुक्कवावारा ।
चरण-करणस्स सारं णिच्छयसुद्ध ण याणंति ॥67॥

Meaning : A man, who is not strong in Sastric lore, passes as one who is well-versed, becomes the enemy of the Sastras as much as he is surrounded by the pupils.
Those, who strictly adhere to rules and regulations and who have left of thinking Jaina and non-Jaina doctrines, are people who do not know the fruit of such rules and regulations with Niscaya Drsti (from philosophical point of view).

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णाणं किरियारहियं किरियामेत्तं च दो वि एगंता ।
असमत्था दाएउं जम्ममरणदुक्ख मा भाई ॥68॥

Meaning : Knowledge without religious practices and religious practices without knowledge are not able to free a man from the turmoils of birth and death because they both are Ekantas (extreme view-points).

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जेज विणा लोगस्स वि ववहारो सव्वहा ण णिव्वडइ ।
तस्स भुवणेक्कगुरुणो णमो अणेगंतवायस्स ॥६९॥
भद्दं मिच्छादंसण समूहमहयस्स अमयसारस्स ।
जिणवयणस्स भगवओ संविग्गसुहाहिगम्मस्स ॥७०॥

Meaning : Be good to Jainism which is the repository of all heresies and which is nectar of nectars and which is easily understood by those desirous of liberation.

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Incomplete

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